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a b s t r a c t
To account for previously ignored, yet widely observed uncertainty in nature's capability to replenish the
natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation (EC) regimes,
this study constructs a stochastic differential game (SDG) model to analyze transboundary pollution
control options between a compensating and compensated region. Equilibrium strategies in the sto-
chastic, two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to
form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract. A case-based numerical example serves to
verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights. First, accounting for various random
disturbance factors, the probabilistic pollutant stock in Stackelberg non-cooperative game exceeds that of
a cooperative game situation. Second, the EC mechanism provides long-term, effective incentives only
when the marginal losses of environmental damage in the compensating region are more than twice that
of the compensated region. Achieving a Pareto optimal equilibrium relies upon the attainment of a
dynamic allocation ratio derived from the analysis of a robust welfare allocation mechanism. Third,
cross-region cooperation reliably outperforms Stackelberg non-cooperation due to either overwhelming
incumbent economic interests or high abatement costs. This study illuminates the importance of
balancing both parties' interests within an EC agreement while reducing uncertainty around unobserved
environmental factors during ex-ante negotiations.
© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Transboundary environmental pollution has drawn increasing
interest from scholars in recent decades with rising awareness of
the impacts and complexity of transnational and transregional
environmental spillovers (M€aler and Zeeuw, 1998; Zhang et al.,
2017; Chang et al., 2018). Discharge problems driven by pollution
mobility has inspired an emerging focus on control regimes ori-
ented to improve total welfare irrespective of administrative limits
by attending to encompassing, transregional outcomes. An
objective focus on mitigating both externalities and ‘free riding’
actions within a cross-administrative pollution context calls for
mechanisms to make local governments' motivations to control
contamination contingent on the interests of their “downstream”
peers (Bardhan, 2002; Kahn et al., 2015).
In China, heightened public attention to policy failures in con-
trolling environmental degradation has inspired a variety of envi-
ronmental control regimes. Amid frequent occurrence of
transboundary pollution events such as large-areas haze, water
disputes and forest destruction (Xu et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2016a; Gu
and Yim, 2016), design specifics for ecological supervision mecha-
nisms have captured increasing attention nationwide (Wang and
Shen, 2016). Experience with a continuous flow of pollutants be-
tween regions has revealed the limited effectiveness of single-
jurisdiction solutions, and ecological compensation (EC) mecha-
nisms of various types have emerged as a promising regulatory tool
with which to align the interests of transregional communities.
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With rising interest in EC design, regulators and scholars exhibit
increasing interest in tools to transfer the right to control trans-
boundary pollution from the local level to upper-levels of govern-
ment regulation (Zhao et al., 2013). Policy proposals include EC
regimes supported by national horizontal transfer payments to
compensate for pollution control expenditures (Yu and Xu, 2016;
Liu et al., 2018) and calibrations to ensure that compensation in-
tensity hinges on the scale and scope of external benefits (Van den
Bergh, 2010; Guan et al., 2016). As a promising mechanism for
aligning stakeholders' interests through economic means to
maintain or improve the broader ecosystem, EC is being rapidly
adopted across China and emerging as a subject of intense exper-
imentation and learning.
Since the introduction of EC in the 1980s in China, studies on EC
have sought to inform a variety of theoretical discussions and
application practices (Pan et al., 2017; Shang et al., 2018; Wang
et al., 2019). Game theory has served to illuminate the relation-
ship between compensation stakeholders and informed several
recent advances. In a novel application by Zhao et al. (2012a), a
transfer tax model employs the typical Stackelberg game between
the government and individual areas to examine an optimal
transfer tax rate. Game theory aids the author in determining the
optimal calibration of the rate to strengthen regional pollution
reduction cooperation andminimize the cost of pollution reduction
across a shared basin.
In other work, Huang et al. (2011) conduct a static Bayesian
gamemodel of one compensator and one compensated party under
complete information. The authors then divide the enforcement of
the compensator to implement environmental policy into two
types, i.e., robust and weak, and explore the influence of the
strategy choice of both parties on the size of EC under incomplete
information. Additional studies by Xu et al. (2012) and Jie et al.
(2012) employ an evolutionary game model to explore changing
outcomes amid conflicted interests in watershed EC. The former
emphasizes that the optimal solution of the evolutionary stability
strategy cannot be achieved solely by upstream and downstream
governments, such that basin-level EC policy requires credible
intervention by the central government. The latter argues that
reasonable determination of an efficient compensation level can
support the evolution of EC mechanism towards a cooperative
equilibrium for a variety of shared water sources.
Despite recent advances in using game theory to improve EC
design, recent efforts have generally neglected to account for a
variety of random disturbances in the game environment that
could prove critical to outcomes (Jørgensen, 2010; Van Long, 2011;
Shi et al., 2016). In real life, strategic choice attends to both the
estimated quantum and timing of expected payment values (Zhao
et al., 2012b) - outcomes regularly influenced by uncertain and
often volatile changes in the external environment (Dellink and
Finus, 2012). These may range from changes in political and cul-
tural environments to shifts in industry performance and market
structure (Yin et al., 2017). Dynamic human factors also shape the
choices of decision-makers (game players) (Aklin and Urpelainen,
2013) via perceptions of psychological benefit, desire for knowl-
edge, and novelty seeking (Lin and Huang, 2012; Czaika and Selin,
2017). Accounting for such factors requires improved method.
Generally speaking, industrial processes create two types of
negative spillovers causing pollution accumulation within and
across regional boundaries. First, pollutants emitted via industrial
production cause a short-term local impact on the immediate en-
virons. Second, the diffusion of pollutants, as by atmospheric mo-
tion or watershed flows, drives a transfer of effluents beyond local
boundaries to accumulate in outlying regions. Many of the under-
lying processes are complex and difficult for decision makers to
anticipate, stochastic interference factors that result in significant
uncertainties in optimal equilibrium outcomes of governance
mechanisms. To improve traction in this decision space, scholars
have called for the development of dynamic game solutions that
contend with stochastic factors (Haurie et al., 1994; Yeung, 2001;
Yeung and Petrosyan, 2005).
In seminal work, Yeung (2007) employs a stochastic differential
game (SDG) framework to study pollution management. Yeung's
work is the first to derive time consistent solutions in a cooperative
differential game environment focused on pollution control out-
comes in which industries and governments constitute separate
entities. A key feature of the resulting game model lies in the
finding that industrial sectors remain competitive among them-
selves while governments cooperate in pollution abatement. Based
on this model, Daskalakis et al. (2009) demonstrate the efficient
emission permit price should exhibit a stochastic character,
resulting from interrelated dynamics of variable scarcity of emis-
sion permits and market discipline. Funke and Paetz (2011) extend
these efforts to construct a robust control framework for applica-
tion to regulatory regimes to mitigate global warming. Yet despite
the well-recognized potential of a SDG model to advance the study
of transboundary spillovers, applications remain scarce. Perhaps
this is due to inherent complexities in deriving tractable assess-
ments of random interference factors (Yeung and Petrosyan, 2008),
such as waste diffusion in river systems or air particulates or noise
pollution generated by production (Dong et al., 2013; Pamen, 2015;
Xu and Lin, 2016). To improve the observation of uncertain yet
relevant factors, this study explores the impact of an ECmechanism
on transboundary pollution within a robust SDG game.
The following queries guide the development and application of
the resulting model. First, how does the introduction of a volatile,
random factor interfere with the dynamic evolution of the
pollutant stock? Second, how does this dynamic alter the efficient
setting of the compensation level for a given level of emissions?
Third, what strategies emerge when two regions become able to
account for the future impact of their decisions governing emission
reduction on alternative game contracts?
To explore these questions, an SDG game model of trans-
boundary pollution must at a minimum encompass one compen-
sated region and one compensating region under an EC
mechanism. Random interference factors, such as topography,
meteorological conditions, and river flows should shape outcomes
from both Stackelberg non-cooperative and cooperative game
contracts. Subsequently, an optimal control theory based on the
maximization of the net present value of welfare outcomes should
help explore the impact of several critical game elements on
outcome states. These may include the respective regions' emission
capacities, their investment efforts in pollution governance, and
some exchange coefficient. In establishing Pareto optimality, an
analysis of a welfare distribution mechanism should further eluci-
date the ideal scope of thewelfare distribution coefficient to inform
an optimal contract. Finally, the game theoretical modeling effort
should be verified through a numerical illustration within a case-
based example to ground the theoretical results and provide
practical recommendations for regulatory policy.
In fulfilling this plan of attack, this study makes a series of sig-
nificant contributions to the research of game theory and envi-
ronmental management. First, this study directly addresses a gap in
the literature left by a lack of work examining the optimization of
transboundary pollution control through dynamic EC mechanisms.
This study expands the literature on transboundary pollution
control by optimizing a robust compensation framework under the
premise of reasonable compensation and a volatile environment. In
doing so, this study takes an important step towards overcoming a
critical difficulty in establishing robust and political sustainable EC
mechanisms (Liu et al., 2018).
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Second, this study deviates from the leading research on
transboundary pollution that focuses primarily on the dynamic
model of deterministic pollutant stocks (Benchekroun and Martín-
Herran, 2016; EI Ouardighi et al., 2018; Vardar and Zaccour, 2018).
Here, a SDG model guarantees the stability of game equilibrium
results and bridges a methodological gap between SDG applica-
tions and the traditional differential games that prevail in trans-
boundary pollution scholarship. The findings inform practical
policy prescriptions for overcoming uncertainties and contract se-
lection problems for effective pollution control.
Third, in cross-walking the SDG simulation model to a real-
world case, the analysis verifies the theoretical results and sheds
light on sufficient conditions under which EC proves an effective
means to coordinate the balance of interests between the
compensating and the compensated regions.
To proceed, Section 2 next details methods governing the
establishment of the SDG model and its two game contracts along
with a comparative analysis of key equilibrium results. Section 3
reports the design of a general allocation mechanism that prom-
ises to be welfare improving. Section 4 then advances a numerical
illustration, while Section 5 and 6 discuss key results and
conclusions.
2. Methodology
2.1. Stochastic differential game model
SDG modeling serves to account for randomly dynamic yet
relevant factors within the two-player strategic game between a
compensating region and a compensated region operating under
the jurisdiction of a central government. Both regions share posi-
tive spillovers of environmental services sustained by either party
through investments in pollution control. This outcome follows
from the fact that environmental quality exhibits public goods at-
tributes that cannot be exclusively consumed by the producing
party. The compensating region generates trans-regional pollution
transmission problems in continuous time. No further adminis-
trative affiliation exists between the two principal actors.
Under equilibrium, returns to environmental quality in the
compensated region exceed that of the compensator, who
conversely faces higher relative returns to industrial development.
These conditions give compensators lower underlying incentives to
sacrifice industrial gains for marginal improvements in environ-
mental quality. Hereafter, under the premise of satisfying the
established situation of both parties, the compensator needs to
share the additional cost thus increased in a timely and sufficient
amount, i.e., EC, which is represented by εðtÞ andmeets 0 εðtÞ  1.
Table 1 reports the key decision variables, player-specific variables,
and game parameters (both fixed and stochastic). Throughout, h ¼
i; j are subscripts of the compensating region and compensator,
respectively.
Assumption 1. Distinct from previous researches (Yeung, 2007;
Li, 2014), which disregards or abstracts away trade-offs between
pollution and regional environmental quality, the present study
considers regional governments as rational economic entities
seeking improvements in both economic and environmental utility.
Therefore, this study integrates a regional utility function in two
key aspects.
First, this study takes the output QhðtÞ of industrial processes to
partially reflect total regional economic development and to be
positively correlated with the quantity of emissions qhðtÞ, i.e.,
QhðtÞ ¼ QhðqhðtÞÞ(h ¼ i;j). Following List and Mason (2001), as well
as Breton et al. (2005, 2006), the resulting utility function of
industrial development RhðQhÞ is characterized by the instanta-
neous emission qhðtÞ and satisfies the law of diminishing marginal
utility:
RhðQhðtÞÞ¼ lnQhðtÞ ¼ lnðahqhÞ (1)
where 0< ah <1 represents the utility coefficient of industrial
development and meets 0< qhðtÞ< ah. Let ai ¼ a and aj ¼ ca, in
which c is a positive constant that measures the marginal differ-
ence between the industrial productivity of the two neighboring
regions.
Second, this study recognizes that each region possesses an
upper limit on the total amount of pollutants qhðtÞ, i.e., a threshold
of emissions that may be sustained by the region h before spilling
over to the neighboring territory. For an output of qhðtÞ produced by
region h, some portion will be retained locally 6hqhðtÞ to region h
itself, where 6h denotes the local portion. Simultaneously, region h
receives the remaining short-term transboundary spillover, deno-
ted as 1 6hðtÞ. Hereafter, let ZhðtÞ be the utility function of
environmental quality, characterizing the reverse linear relation-
ship between regional environmental quality and emissions
quantities:
8<
:
ZiðtÞ ¼ Di
h
qiðtÞ 6iqiðtÞ 

16j

qjðtÞ
i
ZjðtÞ ¼ Dj
h
qjðtÞ 6jqjðtÞ  ð16iÞqiðtÞ
i (2)
whereDh is the utility coefficient of environmental quality of region
h that reveals the region's preference for environmental protection.
Assumption 2. Similar to numerous works on the costs of envi-
ronmental governance (Breton et al., 2008; EI Ouardighi et al.,
2016), let IhðtÞ represents a mitigation function satisfying the law
of rising marginal costs:
IhðtÞ ¼ khu2hðtÞ (3)
where uhðtÞ denotes the mitigation effort of region h at time t. The
Table 1
Notations and definitions.
Decision Variables
qhðtÞ Emission Quantity of region h
εðtÞ Ecological Compensation Coefficient: Rate (%) Setting of the Transfer
Payment
uhðtÞ Mitigation Effort: Quantity of Environmental Governance of region h
Player-specific Variables
ah Utility Coefficient of Industrial Development of region h
Dh Utility Coefficient of Environmental Quality of region h
dh Environmental Loss Factor: Determining Damage to Natural
Environment of region h
qh Pollution Threshold: Upper Limit of Emissions of region h
kh Cost Coefficient of Mitigation Effort of region h
6h Immobile Portion of Local Emissions of region h
16h Transboundary Spillover out of region h
State Variables and Game Parameters
tðtÞ Total Inter-regional Pollutant Stock at time t, with tð0Þ ¼ t0  0
c Inter-regional Difference in Marginal Industrial Productivity
l Reduction to Pollution Stock due to Ecosystem Diffusion
a Marginal Impact Coefficient of Emissions Quantities
b Marginal Impact Coefficient of Mitigation Effort
h Self-purification rate
r Discount rates
Random Interference
sðtðtÞÞ Random Interference Factors
PðtÞ Standard Wiener Process
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cost coefficient associated with the mitigation effort is denoted by
kh >0, and describes the rising resource expense (of capital, human
attention, time, etc) a government must incur to achieve an addi-
tional unit of clean up.
Assumption 3. Practically, the cumulative process of pollutants
generally involves the interaction between natural environment
and pollutants (Bertinelli et al., 2014), and accompanied by certain
random elements. For instance, the absorption of natural envi-
ronment to pollutants, the mutual transmission of pollutants be-
tween regions and the impacts exerted by unpredictable factors
(Kolstad, 2007; Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas, 2012; Masoudi
et al., 2016), inclusive of weather, natural disasters and human
damages. To process such uncertainties, a random term is added to
a standard deterministic differential game to produce a stochastic
differential equation (Jørgensen and Yeung, 1996):
(
dtðtÞ ¼
h
a

qi þ qj

 bui þ uj ðlþ hÞtidt þ sðtðtÞÞdPðtÞ
tð0Þ ¼ t0  0
(4)
where sðtðtÞÞ represents the random interference factor and PðtÞ
refers a standard Wiener process. As such, sðtðtÞÞdPðtÞ describes
disturbances caused by random influences such as topography,
meteorological conditions and river flows. Meanwhile, a>0 and
b>0 measure the marginal impact coefficients of emissions and
mitigation efforts to changes in the pollutant stock. l>0 charac-
terizes the impact exerted by ecosystem diffusion on the pollutant
stock, and h>0 is the natural self-purification rate (e.g. seques-
tration). The pollutant stock in initial planning stage is established
as t0.
Assumption 4. At the current level of pollution control, pollutants
in regional production and consumption will cause diverse dam-
ages to environmental functions, human health and crop yield. As
such, supposing that this damage cost is a linear function of the
current pollutant stock, characterizing the marginal loss of envi-
ronmental quality stemmed from the unit pollution, also known as
environmental degradation costs, denoted in dh. To simplify the
calculation, this study assumes that the above environmental
degradation costs could be overall measured by currency and such
costs will merely cut the revenue of regional government down,
without considering the real losses it brings to the entire social
welfare.
In sum, the two governments are assumed to make rational
decisions in line with the complete information and each aims to
maximize the expectant welfare of their decision-making systems
in an infinite time interval. As such, the welfare functions of two
neighboring regions at time t form:
where r is the discount rate, common to two regions.
2.2. Non-cooperative outcomes
Within a Stackelberg non-cooperative game, neither region
adopts a strategy of environmental cooperation, yet the outcome of
each party creates a substantial impact on the other. Thus, both
sides of the game consider the other's possible reaction when
making decisions. Eq. (6) describes a two-stage Stackelberg non-
cooperative game model formed by the compensating region i
and compensated region j. Subscript D is adopted to obtain a SDG
model in which region h seeks to:
8>>>><
>>>>:
PiðtÞ ¼
ð∞
0
ertfRiðQiÞ þ ZiðtÞ  ð1 εðtÞÞIiðtÞ  ditðtÞgdt
PjðtÞ ¼
ð∞
0
ert

Rj

Qj
þ ZjðtÞ  IjðtÞ  εðtÞIiðtÞ  djtðtÞdt
PðtÞ ¼
ð∞
0
ert

RiðQiÞ þ Rj

Qj
þ ZiðtÞ þ ZjðtÞ  IiðtÞ  IjðtÞ  di þ djtðtÞdt
(5)
8><
>:
max
qi;ui
PDi
ð∞
0
ert
n
ln½aqiðtÞ þ Di
h
qiðtÞ 6iqiðtÞ 

16j

qjðtÞ
i
 ki½1 εðtÞu2i ðtÞ  ditðtÞ
o
dt
max
qj;ε;uj
PDj
ð∞
0
ert
n
ln
h
caqjðtÞ
i
þ Dj
h
qjðtÞ 6jqj  ð16iÞqiðtÞ
i
 kjðtÞu2j ðtÞ  kiεðtÞu2i ðtÞ  djtðtÞ
o
dt
(6)
s: t:
(
dtðtÞ ¼
h
a

qi þ qj

 bui þ uj ðlþ hÞtðtÞidt þ sðtðtÞÞdPðtÞ
tð0Þ ¼ t0  0
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2.2.1. Stackelberg non-cooperative game solutions
Proposition 1. The optimal emission quantity and mitigation effort
of two regions, as well as the optimal EC coefficient are given by:
qD*i ¼
rþ lþ h
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi
; qD*j ¼
rþ lþ h
Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adj
;
uD*i ¼
b

di þ 2dj

4kiðrþ lþ hÞ
; uD*j ¼
bdj
2kjðrþ lþ hÞ
; ε*
¼
8><
>:
2dj  di
2dj þ di
; 2dj  di
0; 2dj < di
; (7)
and the optimal welfare functions for two regions are given by:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1
(1) Under the Stackelberg non-cooperative game, both a higher
discount factor and a higher natural self-purification rate
increase the optimal combined emission quantity of the two
regions (vqD*h =vh>0,vq
D*
h =vr>0). Conversely, the combined
emission quantity will be much lower where the emissions
cause very different levels of damage between regions
(vqD*h =vdh <0). Here, total emissions are further reduced by
increased levels of respective immobility (vqD*h =v6h <0). As
transboundary spillovers rise under non-cooperation, so too,
unsurprisingly, does total pollution.
(2) Both the impact coefficient of mitigation effort on pollutant
stock and the environmental losses positively influence the
optimal mitigation efforts of both sides in the game
(vuD*h =vb>0,vu
D*
h =vdh >0). However, total combined miti-
gation efforts are negatively correlated with the impact co-
efficient of mitigation effort on environmental quality, the
discount factor, and the self-purification rate (vuD*h =vkh <0,
vuD*h =vr<0, vu
D*
h =vh<0).
(3) The optimal EC coefficient is greatly affected by the envi-
ronmental losses in two regions. Given 0 ε*  1, the
implied condition is apparently attained as 0 2dj di  1.
To be specific, when 2dj > di, the compensation ratio will
positively affect the mitigation effort of region i, and subse-
quent analysis and numerical illustrations will be particu-
larly conducted within this scope. When 2dj < di, region jwill
not provide compensation accordingly, and such condition is
not consistent with the foregoing assumptions. The optimal
compensation ratio attains its maximum when 2dj ¼ di.
2.2.2. The limit of expectation and variance
The welfare of two region governments is correspondingly
concerned with the dynamic change in pollutant stocks, and this
process of change is obviously affected by various random distur-
bance factors. Hence, it is necessary to reveal the expectation and
variance limits of pollutant stock.
Substituting the optimal equilibrium strategy Eq. (7) into Eq. (4)
yields:
dtðtÞ ¼ ½U ðlþ hÞtðtÞdt þ sðtðtÞÞdPðtÞ
tð0Þ ¼ t0  0 (9)
where U¼ aðrþlþhÞ
Di6iðrþlþhÞþadi þ
aðrþlþhÞ
Dj6jðrþlþhÞþadj 
b
2ðdiþ2djÞ
4kiðrþlþhÞ 
b
2
dj
2kjðrþlþhÞ is a
constant, and the greater the pollutant stock, the larger U.
According to the stochastic analysis theory,
sðtðtÞÞdPðtÞ ¼ s ffiffiffitp dPðtÞ is further set, informing a definition of
Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. The limit of expectation and variance of pollutant
stock in non-cooperative game feedback equilibrium meets the
condition:
E
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ U
lþ hþ

t0
U
lþ h

eðlþhÞt ; lim
t/þ∞
E
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ U
lþ h
(10)
8>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>:
PD*i ¼ ln


aðrþ lþ hÞ
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi

þ Di
"
qiðtÞ 
6iðrþ lþ hÞ
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi


16j
ðrþ lþ hÞ
Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adj
#
 2dib
22dj þ di
16kiðrþ lþ hÞ2
 dit
PD*j ¼ ln
"
caðrþ lþ hÞ
Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adj
#
þ Dj
"
qjðtÞ 
6jðrþ lþ hÞ
Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adj
 ð16iÞðrþ lþ hÞ
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi
#
 b

2dj  di

16kiðrþ lþ hÞ2
 b
2d2j
4kjðrþ lþ hÞ2
 djt
(8)
S
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ s
2U 2½U ðlþ hÞt0eðlþhÞt þ ½U 2ðlþ hÞt0e2ðlþhÞt
2ðlþ hÞ2
lim
t/þ∞
S
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ s
2U
2ðlþ hÞ2
(11)
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Proof. See Appendix B.
2.3. Cooperative arrangement
This section assumes that the adjoining two regions have
reached the cooperative agreement with binding force in advance,
with the goal of maximizing the sum of long-term net welfare
values. By using the superscript C, the common dynamic optimal
solution can be acquired through jointly optimizing the welfare
function of two regions, i.e.,:
2.3.1. Cooperative game solutions
Proposition 3. The optimal conditions are necessary and sufficient,
including:
qC*i ¼
rþ lþ h
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ Djð16iÞðrþ lþ hÞ þ a

di þ dj
;
qC*j ¼
rþ lþ h
Di

16j
ðrþ lþ hÞ þ Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi þ dj;
uC*i ¼
b

di þ dj

2kiðrþ lþ hÞ
; uC*j ¼
b

di þ dj

2kjðrþ lþ hÞ
(13)
and the optimal welfare functions for two regions are as follows:
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 2
Under the cooperative game condition, equilibrium strategies in
both regions are insulated from any change in EC coefficient.
Meanwhile, regional damages in the two neighboring regions are
the focal determinant of the optimal emission quantity. The
influence of the additional factors on equilibrium strategies is
generally similar as in the Stackelberg non-cooperative game.
2.3.2. The limit of expectation and variance
To explore the role of ex post expectations and ex ante variance
in the pollutant stock in shaping strategies over the course of a
cooperative game, the results of Eq. (13) can be substituted into Eq.
(4) to yield:
dtðtÞ ¼ ½Y ðlþ hÞtðtÞdt þ sðtðtÞÞdPðtÞ
tð0Þ ¼ t0  0 (15)
where
Y¼ aðrþ lþ hÞ
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ Djð16iÞðrþ lþ hÞ þ a

di þ dj

þ aðrþ lþ hÞ
Di

16j
ðrþ lþ hÞ þ Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi þ dj
þ aðrþ lþ hÞ
Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adj
 b
2di þ dj
2kiðrþ lþ hÞ
 b
2di þ dj
2kjðrþ lþ hÞ
is a constant, and the greater the pollutant stock, the largerY.
Subsequently,sðtðtÞÞdPðtÞ ¼ s ffiffiffitp dPðtÞ, foundation for defining
Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4. The limit of expectation and variance of the pollutant
stock in cooperative game feedback equilibrium satisfies:
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
¼ Y
lþ hþ

t0
Y
lþ h

eðlþhÞt ; lim
t/∞
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
¼ Y
lþ h
(16)
max
qhðtÞ;uhðtÞ
PC
ð∞
0
ert
8><
>:
ln
h
aqiðtÞ
i
þ ln
h
caqjðtÞ
i
þ Di
h
qiðtÞ 6iqiðtÞ 

16j

qjðtÞ
i
þ Dj
h
qjðtÞ
6jqjðtÞ  ð16iÞqiðtÞ
i
 kiu2i ðtÞ  kju2j ðtÞ
i
 di þ djtðtÞi
9>=
>;dt (12)
s: t:

dtðtÞ ¼ aEi þ Ej bui þ uj ðlþ hÞtðtÞdt þ sðtðtÞÞdPðtÞ
tð0Þ ¼ t0  0
PC* ¼ ln


aðrþ lþ hÞ
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi

þ Di
"
qiðtÞ 
6iðrþ lþ hÞ
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi


16j
ðrþ lþ hÞ
Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adj
#
 2dib
22dj þ di
16kiðrþ lþ hÞ2
 ditðtÞ
(14)
S
h
tCðtÞ
i
¼ s
2Y 2½Y ðlþ hÞt0eðlþhÞt þ ½Y 2ðlþ hÞt0e2ðlþhÞt
2ðlþ hÞ2
lim
t/þ∞
S
h
tCðtÞ
i
¼ s
2Y
2ðlþ hÞ2
(17)
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Proof. See Appendix D.
3. Welfare allocation mechanism
To guarantee a thorough and lasting cooperation, all parties
must agree to re-allocate utility willingly through time. To this end,
a robust welfare allocation mechanism should form the linchpin of
a governance arrangement by eliminating instability in a cooper-
ation alliance and supporting continuous cooperation. A welfare
allocation mechanism is robust over time when it is able to satisfy
both overall rationality and individual rationality. Overall ratio-
nality ensures all possible welfare improvements may be obtained
through a cooperative alliance. Individual rationality requires that
the gains of a cooperative strategy exceed those of a Stackelberg
non-cooperative strategy. The mechanism is furthermore consid-
ered dynamic in its ability to do so at any time (Yeung, 1992).
Within a SDG model, these conditions should hold when all parties
agree to implement the cooperative strategy over the entire game.
Abiding by Rubinstein (1982) bargaining principle, governments
in each region in time duration [0, þ∞] not only acquire earnings
without cooperation, but also gain additional value from the
sharing cooperation with other parties. Assuming that the welfare
of region i accounted for x in the overall welfare of the two parties
under cooperative case, then the share for region j is 1 x, and
satisfies 0 x  1.Therefore, individual rationality demands:
xPC PDi ; ð1 xÞPC  PDj (18)
From Eq. (18), it can be deduced x2
"
PDi
PC
;
PCPDj
PC
#
. For xmax ¼
PCPDj
PC
, xmin ¼ P
D
i
PC
, then in the welfare allocation of x2 ½xmin; xmax
and both sides of the game aim to seek greater payoffs. The dis-
count factor in the Rubinstein bargaining model can be adopted to
manipulate the welfare allocation ratio x. Let 4i and 4j denote the
discount factors for two regions, i.e., their ‘bargaining power’ or
‘patience level’ such that thesewill satisfy conditions 0 4i  1 and
0 4j  1.
As the dominant party in the pollution control investment, re-
gion i takes the lead in the bargaining process. Applying the
Rubinstein indefinite periodic bidding game, the only subgame that
may be solved to a refined Nash equilibrium:
R ¼ 1 4j
1 4i4j
(19)
Combined with x2½xmin; xmax, the following optimal allocation
ratio in two regions guarantees this requirement:
x¼ 1 4j
1 4i4j
ðxmax xminÞ þ xmin (20)
As such, the total welfares allocated between the two regions
will be sustained under a robust dynamic allocation mechanism
when:
8>><
>>:
PCi ¼
1 4j
1 4i4j
h
PC 

PDi þPDj
i
þPDi
PCj ¼
4jð1 4iÞ
1 4i4j
h
PC 

PDi þPDj
i
þPDj
(21)
Under forced cooperation, all possible allocations could practi-
cally satisfy the optimal objective of total collective welfare irre-
spective of the allocation mechanism. Yet, only this robust dynamic
allocation mechanism - satisfying individual rationality e promises
to ensure sustained cooperation and the attainment of Pareto
optimality through time.
4. Numerical illustrations
The results presented thus far, while analytically compelling,
may further benefit from practical grounding in a real-world
example. This section thus assesses the results of the game theo-
retic models against a realistic backdrop of the first, inter-provincial
watershed EC mechanism deployed in China. A numerical illus-
tration serves to illustrate (i) how dynamic state variables shape
expectations and variance in the stock of pollutants and (ii) how
related and key parameter values affect equilibrium strategies of
both sides of the game.
4.1. Xin'an River Basin e Anhui and Zhejiang Province, China
Xin'an River Basin (XRB) spans Anhui and Zhejiang provinces,
originating from Xiuning County of Huangshan City in Anhui
Province (Fig. 1). XRB's primary watercourse flows through Jiekou
Town to the form the largest inbound river to Zhejiang Province
and the primary feed to Qiandao Lake in Chun'an County. In addi-
tion to providing drinkingwater formany communities of Zhejiang,
Qiandao Lake is a strategic water reserve for the broader Yangtze
River Delta. Since the beginning of the 21st century, degradation of
inflowing water from the upper reaches of XRB in Anhui has pro-
duced increasingly serious levels of eutrophication of Qiandao Lake.
Upstream pollution control thus holds profound practical signifi-
cance for ensuring the quality of this critical, downstream reserve.
For the downstream government, high levels of economic and
social development produce relatively higher requirements for
water quality that those experienced in the relatively undeveloped
municipalities upstream. Downstream communities have very low
incentives to sacrifice environmental quality for additional eco-
nomic benefit. Thus, to achieve a better environment for both living
and industrial production, upstream and downstream manage-
ment agencies have sought an effective EC mechanism to incen-
tivize reductions of upstream pollution.
Since 2012, under the guidance of the Ministry of Finance and
the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, Anhui and
Zhejiang provinces have carried out two rounds of pilot projects for
an EC regime linking the upper and lower reaches of XRB. Each pilot
has lasted three years and linked Huangshan City in the upper
reaches with Jixi County in Xuancheng City and Chun'an County in
Hangzhou City below.
For the sake of SDG analysis, the key stakeholders are simplified
as the upper XRB compensated region i and the lower XRB
compensating region j. Based on in-person investigations and data
collection from the relevant government departments and enter-
prises, we establish respective pollution thresholds as qi ¼ 30 and
qj ¼ 40, and the utility coefficients of environmental quality of two
regional government meet the condition Di ¼ 2, Dj ¼ 6. Further,
according to the value range of local emission immobile portion
and environmental loss factors by Yeung and Petrosyan (2008) and
Huang et al. (2016), the immobile portion of local emission as
established as 6i ¼ 0.4 and 6j ¼ 0.8, and the environmental loss
factor lower for the upstream region, i.e., di ¼1 and dj ¼ 5. Referring
to Heutel (2012), we set environmental self-degradation parame-
ters of pollutant emissions at h¼ 0.25. Cost coefficients of mitiga-
tion effort are ki ¼ 0.7 and kj ¼ 0.4, while a constellation of
additional parameters is held at: a¼ 3, c¼1, a¼ 0.7, b¼ 0.4,
r¼ 0.5, l¼ 0.4, t0 ¼ 60, 4i ¼ 0.5, 4j ¼ 0.6, s¼ 0.07.
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4.2. Analysis of stochastic pollutant stock
Using the simulationmethod of Prasad and Sethi (2004), for Eqs.
(9 and 15), the numerical approximation follows:
tðtþQÞ¼ tðtÞ þ ðUðlþhÞtðtÞÞQþ s
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
tðtÞ
p ffiffiffiffi
Q
p
zðtÞ (22)
tðtþQÞ¼ tðtÞ þ ðYðlþ hÞtðtÞÞQþ s
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
tðtÞ
p ffiffiffiffi
Q
p
zðtÞ (23)
where the random variable zðtÞ  Nð0;1Þ, i.e., zðtÞ is the indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard normal random
variable with a time step of Q¼ 0.001.
As shown graphically in Fig. 2 above, the state variable (i.e.,
pollutant stock) fluctuates continuously due to the Brownian mo-
tion, making it difficult for either the upstream or downstream
player to obtain an exact value of watershed pollutant stocks at any
given time. Note the pollutant stock of cooperative game is not
necessarily lower than that of Stackelberg non-cooperative game at
any time.
Hereafter, following procedures established in Zwillinger
(1998), a confidence interval can be adopted to describe the vari-
ation range of the pollutant stock. At a 95% confidence level, the
confidence interval of pollutant stocks should be ðE½tðtÞ 
1:96
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
S½tðtÞp ; E½tðtÞ þ 1:96 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiS½tðtÞp Þ. Setting a confidence interval
improves the predictive power of diagnostic tools for watershed
management departments who deal with fluctuation in effluent
matter. Whereas minor fluctuations in observed ranges range
require a rough check, major overshoots of the interval indicate a
need for detailed review.
Further, the simulation holds quite true to observed, real-world
conditions recalled in Fig. 2. Indeed, Chinese policymakers regu-
larly fail to accurately predict actual, observed values of pollutant
stocks in the XRB basin's primary river. The use of an interval im-
proves predictive power, in linewith Huang et al. (2016), who argue
that optimal management strategies should take emission levels as
a control to be optimized in tandem with dynamic states of the
wider ecosystem.We concur that analysts too often attend solely to
the difficulty of coordinating optimal emission levels and neglect to
account for random disturbances in the environment driving out-
comes. Accounting for the absorption rate of the natural environ-
ment, as well as the reciprocal transmission rates of pollutants
across borders, are critical to setting an optimal compensation rate.
4.3. Sensitivity analysis of optimal equilibrium feedback
Due to the multi-directional and interactive relationship be-
tween the upper XRB and lower XRB, relevant shifts in keys
parameter each differ across various game contracts. To better
observe changes of relevant parameters, let the expected value of
pollutant stock is set to 10 in advance. Next, by fixing other pa-
rameters unchanged and changing any of the parameter according
to the pattern of 50%, 25%, þ25%, þ50%, a sensitivity analysis of
optimal equilibrium strategies for key parameters appears in
Table 2. Within the value range of the given model parameters
employed in the analysis of the XRB regime, the EC coefficient
Fig. 1. The location of Xin'an River Basin.
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ε* ¼ 0.82 may be attained to satisfy the condition of 2dj > di. The
impacts exerted by different parameters are specific presented
below.
4.3.1. Changes in dh
Sensitivity analysis indicates the slope of optimal emission
quantities at the same point (i.e., at any di from 0.5 to 1.5 and dj from
2.5 to 7.5) presents a declining trend in both game situations.
Meanwhile, respective mitigation efforts reveal an opposing trend.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, increasing environmental losses enable
both upstream and downstream players to reduce emissions within
their jurisdictions through greater levels of proactive mitigation.
Yet increasing dh also means higher levels of environmental dam-
age at lower optimal emission quantities. In particular, environ-
mental losses in the economically underdeveloped region, i.e, the
upper reach of XRB, remain relatively high, indicating upstream
regions are apt to persist in following incumbent patterns of
laissez-faire control.
4.3.2. Changes in Dh
Under an increasing utility coefficient of environmental quality
(Dh), optimal welfare of both upper and lower XRB improves under
both games. However, it is noteworthy that within the Stackelberg
non-cooperative situation, the trend of optimal emission quantities
in two regions runs counter to welfare. Taking the upper XRB as an
example, as a rational “economic participant”, Anhui possesses
local incentive to cut emissions, resulting in a slight drop to 0.58.
Yet such environmental preference-induced changes have no direct
impact on emission capacities downstream. Under cooperation,
instantaneous emissions on both sides are more apt to decrease in
sequence, with net increases to both upstream and downstream
welfare.
4.3.3. Changes in 6h
Variation in the immobile portion of local emissions (6h) does
not directly impact regional investment behavior or the EC coeffi-
cient in either two game situations, yet it leads to important
changes to welfare outcomes. For example, when upstream
immobility of emissions increases from 0.2 to 0.6, - at any level
downstream 6i - upstream welfare decreases accordingly, i.e., P
D*
i
falls from 30.15 to 29.79. The downstream player is less affected by
the transboundary spillover 1 6i, and enjoys a slight increase in
local welfare PD*j from 85.54 to 86.87. The same dynamic holds in
vice versa. Under cooperation, it is precisely this impacts of the
transboundary spillover 16h that motivate both the upper and
lower reaches to improve governance and encourage local industry
to reduce emissions.
4.3.4. Changes in b and kh
Under the Stackelberg non-cooperative game, a tripling in the
Table 2
Sensitivity analysis.
Variables qD*i =q
C*
i q
D*
j =q
C*
j u
D*
i =u
C*
i u
D*
j =u
C*
j ε
* PD*i =P
D*
j =P
C*
i =P
C*
j
Benchmark 0.76/0.13 0.14/0.12 0.34/0.37 0.54/0.65 0.82 30.15/85.54/30.67/85.92
di¼(0.50/ 1.50) e e  e þ þ  þ e e þ e þ
dj¼(2.50/ 7.50)  e e e þ þ þ þ þ e e e e
6i¼(0.20/ 0.60) e e        e þ e þ
6j¼(0.40/ 1.20)   e e      þ e þ e
Di¼(1.00/ 3.00) e e  e      þ þ þ þ
Dj¼(3.00/ 9.00)  e e e      þ þ þ þ
b¼(0.05/ 0.15)     þ þ þ þ  e e e e
ki¼(0.35/ 1.05)     e  e   þ þ þ þ
kj¼(0.20/ 0.60)      e  e   þ þ þ
Fig. 2. Expectations and variance in actual pollution stocks between two game contracts.
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value of b (from 0.05 to 0.15) raises upstream mitigation effort uD*i
from 0.34 to 0.51. Conversely, a tripling of ki decreases upstream
mitigation effort from 0.34 to 0.23. The lower the input cost of
mitigation, the more effective the effort as government more
vigorously implements reform. Sensitivity analysis further high-
lights that cooperation encourages an upstream, compensated re-
gion to invest more in mitigation in ways that increase total
welfare. This finding is consistent with Assumption 2, which de-
scribes the rising resource expenses of capital, attention, time, etc. a
government incurs to achieve an additional unit of clean up.
Because both parties remain bound by the compensation agree-
ment, an economically developed region has incentives to support
both sustained eco-environmental protection and industrial in-
vestment in less-industrialized, upstream neighbors. Incentives to
this end should serve to promote more balanced development.
5. Results and discussion
In this section, we discuss the equilibrium strategies given by
the investigated game models. On the whole, optimal equilibrium
feedback analysis and simulation analysis of the two games provide
useful reference values for dealing with transboundary pollution
and drive a series of important discussion points.
Proposition 5. Optimal emission quantities of two regions meet the
conditions qC*i < q
D*
i and q
C*
j < q
D*
j .
This implies that when a pollution spillover occurs, and the two
sides influence each other’s incentives to invest in mitigation, the
optimal total emission quantity of the Stackelberg non-cooperative
situation exceeds that of the cooperative alternative. In other words,
the presence of a pollution spillover and its influence on the behavioral
incentives of the counterparty leads to significantly lower optimal
emission quantities under cooperation. Decision-making differences
are further affected by multiple coefficients (e.g. the utility coefficient
of environmental quality, immobile portion of local emissions, and
environmental damage losses), which are in turn shaped by the
strength of the spillover (Proof, see appendix E).
More precisely, when neither side selects a strategy of joint
governance, regional governments make decisions seeking the
maximization of their discrete welfare, i.e., considering solely the
impact of emissions on economic output and the local environ-
ment, while ignoring the negative utilities generated by the
external spillover. To the contrary, in the case of cooperative game,
both sides emphasize the impact of pollution in surrounding re-
gions on their internal utilities, cognizant that the transmission of
pollutants across regional lines erodes overall regional welfare. This
result differs from a key conclusion of Yeung (2007), who focuses
on the global impact of pollution but largely neglects the role of
localized environmental dynamics in shaping outcomes. To wit,
reductions in winter haze and water pollution in China have often
hinged more on favorable diffusion conditions than the imposition
of stricter controls (Hao and Liu, 2016; Liu et al., 2016a, b).
Proposition 6. In the cooperative game, the optimal mitigation ef-
forts in both regions is higher than that in the Stackelberg non-
cooperative case, i.e., uC*i >u
D*
i and u
C*
j >u
D*
j .
Here, the difference between the two sides of the game are not only
affected by the cost coefficient of mitigation effort and marginal
impact coefficient of mitigation effort, but also by the environmental
damage losses of the compensated region. Given ε* ¼ ð2dj  diÞ=
ð2dj þ diÞ>0, 2dj > di holds (Proof, see appendix E).
It is worth noting this condition possesses practical significance.
The environmental damage losses of compensating region should be
more than twice that of compensated region, i.e.,2dj > di. If such con-
dition is not met, the cooperation process will not attain Pareto
improvement, depriving the compensator of motivation to ameliorate
total environmental losses caused by the trans-regional spillover. This
is particularly relevant for watershed eco-compensation in China,
where an upper-level entity, often a higher-level government, has a
clear role to bring upstream (water-supplying) and downstream
(water-receiving) jurisdictions together within an efficient mecha-
nism. In practice, with the increase in mitigation effort, the compen-
sating region will inevitably suffer from economic losses if long-term
investments are unrewarded. Therefore, to ensure the sustainable
development of the entire regional environment, it is necessary for the
compensator to encourage the compensating region to encourage
greater governance through a compensation payment.
As one of the largest polluters in the world, with more than
40,000 local jurisdictions in varying stages of development, China
has seen growing collaboration among local governments amid
rising pressure from the Central Government for environmental
protection (Yang, 2017). While the state has expended much effort
using environmental finance tools like EC to drive abatement,
decision-makers have invested only modest consideration estab-
lishing best-practices for tool selection and calibration. Better
policymaking should possess sound scientific basis in attending to
implementation risks, particularly where policy failure may prove
particularly costly to both large state-led projects and local com-
munities. In China’s growth-driven economy, where environmental
protection resources are in short supply, calibrating effective and
adaptive compensation standards should prove critical to securing
positive and sustained policy outcomes.
Proposition 7. The expected value and variance of the pollutant
stock and its corresponding stable value in the cooperative game are
smaller than those in the Stackelberg non-cooperative situation, i.e.,:
(
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
< E
h
tDðtÞ
i
; lim
t/∞
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
< lim
t/∞
E
h
tDðtÞ
i
S
h
tCðtÞ
i
< S
h
tDðtÞ
i
; lim
t/∞
S
h
tCðtÞ
i
< lim
t/∞
S
h
tDðtÞ
i
This indicates that in the non-cooperative game, the stock of
pollutant is higher than that in the cooperative game. Further, variance
in the pollutant stock is significantly affected by various random
interference factors, as both sides must synchronously bear greater
risks to achieve higher economic and environmental utilities (Proof,
see appendix E).
By modelling uncertainty in nature’s capability to replenish the
environment, we thus show that the ultimate pollutant stock in the
non-cooperative game is probabilistically higher than under
cooperation. Thus, although the effectiveness of environmental
pollution control still depends to a key extent on the subjective
initiative of administrators, commitments remain contingent on
multiple uncertainties including the degree of pollution transfer,
terrain conditions and hydrological characteristics. This finding
supports expanded investment in monitoring and evaluation of
natural phenomena and processes, and in skills for deciphering and
disseminating such relevant data to public managers and their
private sector counterparts.
6. Conclusions
6.1. Conclusions and implications
This study develops a SDG model to examine the transboundary
pollution issue between one compensating region and one
ecological compensated region - in the absence of administrative
subordination - via an ECmechanism. This robust, game theoretical
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investigation of compensation processes contends with negative
spillovers of a regional accumulative pollutant and incorporates
stochastic processes to account for uncertain dynamics in pollution
stocks and environmental factors that could otherwise confound an
efficient remedial contract. The SDG model allows equilibrium
strategies of two neighboring governments to evolve and it informs
amore optimal control theory based on a general welfare allocation
mechanism. By determining and contrasting outcomes across both
cooperative and non-cooperative game scenarios, with validation
via a numerical simulation based on the XRB case, this study
returns several insights:First, equilibrium results show that as a
long-term mechanism, an EC contract is most effective when
marginal losses due to additional environmental damage in the
compensating region are more than twice those of the compen-
sated region. This finding should aid help decision makers identify
relative ecological and economic thresholds for deploying EC con-
tracts across China.
Second, the analysis shows the ultimate pollutant stock in the
non-cooperative game is probabilistically higher than that in a
cooperative game, underscoring the importance of pro-cooperation
incentives to avoid conditions inwhich both sides are forced to bear
risks synchronously in mutually-undermining pursuit of higher
utilities. Where non-cooperation prevails, policymakers will likely
experience significantly greater difficulty assessing the actual
pollutant levels, such that establishing reliable confidence intervals
for likely effluent values may provide a useful diagnostic tool for
environmental managers.
Third, for an EC contract to remain credible, a degree of time
consistency is required, i.e. compliance must remain economically
optimal for all parties to the agreement at all times. An inter-
temporal decomposition of the welfare allocation mechanism al-
lows us to obtain time consistent outcomes and inform a grounded
simulation of outcomes. Based on this advance, our investigation
demonstrates that cross-regional cooperation constantly out-
performs Stackelberg non-cooperation, irrespective of variations in
economic interests and cost-sensitivities to emission abatement.
6.2. Limitations
This study retains several limitations that call for further
research. Practically, transboundary spillovers are multi-faceted,
such that efficient control may be best accomplished through the
participation and interaction of multiple entities. In China, these
may include regional governments, major enterprises, and the
public at large. Inclusion of these additional players introduces
engaging problems for robust game analyses and future studies.
Research extensions should also consider incorporating the EC
compensation coefficient into prevailing models and adapting this
rate to the regulation of supply and demand on the basis of fulfilling
a robust welfare allocation mechanism.
Acknowledgment
This study was supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (Nos. 71573283, 71701217); the National Social
Science Fund of China (No.19BJY028); the Tier 1 Academic Research
Fund of Singapore's Ministry of Education (No. #16-C207-SMU-
023); the Startup Foundation for Introducing Talent of NUIST (No.
2019r045). The authors are grateful to the editor and the anony-
mous referees for their constructive comments and profound in-
sights to improve this study.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
With the inverse induction method, the optimization problem
of region i is attained asPD*i ðqi;uiÞ ¼ ertVDi ðtÞ after time t. Abiding
by the optimal control theory, VDi ðtÞ for any t  0 satisfies the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation below:
where VD
0
i ðtÞ ¼ dV
D
i ðtÞ
dt and V
D00
i ðtÞ ¼ d
2VDi ðtÞ
dt2 .
Differentiate the above HJB equation with respect to qi and ui,
the optimal feedback strategies are then acquired as:
q*i ¼
1
Di6i  aVD
0
i
; u*i ¼ 
bVD
0
i
2kið1 εÞ
(25)
Likewise, the optimization problem of region j is PD*j ðqj;uj; εÞ ¼
ertVDj ðtÞ after time t. The HJB equation associated with such
optimal control problem is expressed as:
One can usually characterize the optimal feedback strategies of
qj, uj and ε from the first-order condition:
rVDi ðtÞ ¼ maxEi;ui
8><
>:
lnðaqiÞ þ Di
h
qi 6iqi 

16j

qj
i
 kið1 εÞu2i  dit
þVD0i ðtÞ
h
a

qi þ qj

 bui þ uj ðlþ hÞtiþ s2ðtÞ2 VD00i ðtÞ
9>=
>; (24)
rVDj ðtÞ ¼ maxqj;uj;ε
8><
>:
ln

caqj

þ Dj
h
qj 6jqj  ð16iÞqi
i
 kju2j  εkiu2i  djt
þVD0j
h
a

qi þ qj

 bui þ uj ðlþ hÞtiþ s2ðtÞ2 VD00j ðtÞ
9>=
>; (26)
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q*j ¼
1
Dj6j  aVD
0
j
; u*j ¼ 
bVD
0
j
2kj
; ε* ¼ 2V
D0
j  VD
0
i
2VD
0
j þ VD
0
i
; (27)
which when substituting back into the above two HJB equations
yields:
Following the structure of Eq. (28), the linear analytical formula
of VDi ðtÞ and VDj ðtÞ for t is assumed as:
nVDi ðtÞ ¼ m1tþm2
VDj ðt

¼ n1tþ n2
(29)
where m1, m2, n1 and n2 are constant.
Substituting the above general function forms, VD
0
i ðtÞ ¼ m1 and
VD
0
j ðtÞ ¼ n1 into Eq. (28) yields:
Let t  0, the parameter values of Eq. (29) can be calculated:
8>>>><
>>>>:
m1¼
di
rþlþh
m2¼ln

a
Di6iam1

rþðDiqi1Þ

rDi16jam1.
Dj6jan1

r
þhb2m1ðm1þ2n1Þi.8rkiþb2m1n1.2rkj
(31)
8>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
rVDi ðtÞ ¼ 
h
di þ ðlþ hÞVD
0
i ðtÞ
i
tþ s
2ðtÞ
2
VD
00
i ðtÞ þ ln
"
a
Di6i  aVD
0
i ðtÞ
#
þ Diqi  1
Di

16j
 aVD0i ðtÞ
Dj6j  aVD
0
j ðtÞ
þ
b2VD
0
i
h
2VD
0
j ðtÞ þ VD
0
i ðtÞ
i
8ki
þ b
2VD
0
i ðtÞVD
0
j ðtÞ
2kj
rVDj ðtÞ ¼ 
h
dj þ

lþ h

VD
0
j

t
i
tþ
s2

t

2
VD
00
j
 
t
!
þ ln
"
ca
Dj6j  aVD
0
j

t

#
þ Djqj  1
Djð16iÞ  aV
D0
j ðtÞ
Di6i  aVD
0
i ðtÞ
þ
b2
h
2VD
0
j ðtÞ þ VD
0
i ðtÞ
i2
16ki
þ b
2VD
02
j ðtÞ
4kj
(28)
8>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>:
rðm1tþm2Þ ¼ ½di þ ðlþ hÞm1tþ ln


a
Di6i  am1

þ Diqi  1
Di

16j
 am1
Dj6j  an1
þb
2m1½m1 þ 2n1
8ki
þ b
2m1n1
2kj
rðn1tþ n2Þ ¼ 

dj þ

lþ hn1tþ ln
"
ca
Dj6j  an1
#
þ Djqj  1
Dj

16i
 an1
Di6i  am1
þb
2½m1 þ 2n12
16ki
þ b
2n21
4kj
(30)
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8>>>>><
>>>>>:
n1¼
dj
rþlþh
n2¼ln
 
ca
Dj6jþan1
!,
rþ
 
Djqj1
!,
r
"
Dj
 
16i
!
an1
#
.h
Di6iam1

r
i
þ
h
b2

m1þ2n1
2
16rkiþb2n21

4rkj
(32)
By substituting the results of Eqs. (31 and 32) into Eqs. (25 and
27), respectively, the conclusion of Proposition 1 can be attained,
thus completing the Proof.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
Ito^’s lemma is an identity adopted in Ito^ calculus to search the
change of function over time in a stochastic process. If FðtÞ is a
quadratic continuous differential function, then t satisfies the
following Ito^ stochastic integral equation:
FðBðtÞÞ¼ Fð0Þ þ
ðt
0
F 0ðs;BðsÞÞdBðsÞ þ 1
2
ðt
0
F 0ðs;BðsÞÞds (33)
where fBðtÞ : t2½0;∞Þg is the Brownian motion.
Accordingly, Eq. (9) can be rewritten as a random integral:
(
tðtÞ ¼ t0 þ
ðt
0
½U ðlþ hÞtðsÞdsþ
ðt
0
s
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
tðsÞ
p
dPðsÞ
tð0Þ ¼ t0  0
(34)
where U ¼ aðrþlþhÞ
Di6iðrþlþhÞþadi þ
aðrþlþhÞ
Dj6jðrþlþhÞþadj 
b
2ðdiþ2djÞ
4kiðrþlþhÞ 
b
2
dj
2kjðrþlþhÞ.
It is easy to judge that the expectation of pollutant stock is in-
dependent of random disturbance factor, then:
(
E½tðtÞ ¼ t0 þ
ðt
0
fU ðlþ hÞE½tðsÞgds
E½tð0Þ ¼ t0
(35)
The above equation can be seen as the ordinary differential
equation with respect to E½tðtÞ, and the solution is:
8><
>:
E
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ U
lþ hþ

t0 
U
lþ h

eðlþhÞt
E
h
tDð0Þ
i
¼ t0
(36)
Subsequently, to obtain the variance of pollutant stock, Ito^
lemma is supposed to be applied to Eq. (9):
(
dt2ðtÞ ¼
h
2Uþ s2

t 2ðlþ hÞt2
i
dt þ 2ts ffiffiffitp dPðtÞ
t2ð0Þ ¼ ðt0Þ2  0
(37)
Accordingly, the above equation can be rewritten as the
following random integral form:
and its expectation is,
8><
>:
E


t2

t

¼t20þ
ðt
0
n
2Uþs2

E
h
t

s
i
2

lþh

E


t2

s

ds
E
h
t2

0
i
¼

t0
2
(39)
Substituting the result of Eq. (36) into Eq. (39) and rewritten it as
the differential form:
Solving the above linear non-homogeneous differential equa-
tion yields:
8<
: t
2ðtÞ ¼ t20 þ
ðt
0
h
2Uþ s2

tðsÞ  2ðlþ hÞt2ðsÞ
i
dsþ
ðt
0
2tðsÞs
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
tðsÞ
p
dPðsÞ
t2ð0Þ ¼ ðt0Þ2  0
(38)
8><
>:
dE
h
t2ðtÞ
i.
dt ¼

2Uþ s2
h U
lþ hþ

t0 
U
lþ h

eðlþhÞt
i
 2ðlþ hÞE
h
t2ðtÞ
i
E
h
t2ðtÞ
i
¼ ðt0Þ2
(40)
8>><
>>:
E
h
t2ðtÞ
i
¼ t20e2ðlþhÞt þ
U

2Uþ s2

2ðlþ hÞ2

1 e2ðlþhÞt

þ

2Uþ s2

½t0ðlþ hÞ  U
ðlþ hÞ2

eðlþhÞt  e2ðlþhÞt

E
h
t2ð0Þ
i
¼ ðt0Þ2
(41)
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Hence, the variance of the pollutant stock can be computed as:
S
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ E
h
t2ðtÞ
i

h
E
h
tDðtÞ
ii2
¼ s
2U2½UðlþhÞt0eðlþhÞtþ½U2ðlþhÞt0e2ðlþhÞt
2ðlþhÞ2
(42)
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3
Under cooperative arrangement, the optimization problem of
two regions after time t is required as PC ¼ ertVCðtÞ. For any t 
0, VCðtÞ satisfies the HJB equation below:
where VC
0 ðtÞ ¼ dVC ðtÞdt and VC
00 ðtÞ ¼ d2VCðtÞdt2 .
Similarly, one can generate the optimal feedback strategies of qi,
qj, ui and uj from the first-order condition:
q*i ¼
1
Di6i þ Djð16iÞ  aVC0 ðtÞ
; q*j
¼ 1
Di

16j
þ Dj6j  aVC 0 ðtÞ;
u*i ¼ 
bVC
0
2ki
; u*j ¼ 
bVC
0
2kj
(44)
and form:
rVCðtÞ¼
"
diþdjþðlþhÞVC
0 ðtÞ
#
tþs
2ðtÞ
2
VC
00
ðtÞ
þln
"
a
Di6iþDjð16iÞaVC0 ðtÞ
#
þln½ ca
Di

16j
þDj6jaVC 0 ðtÞ
#
þDiqiþDjqjþ
b2VC
02ðtÞ
4ki
þb
2VC
02ðtÞ
4kj
2 (45)
Similarly, the linear analytical formula of VCðtÞ for t is:
VCðtÞ¼ s1tþ s2 (46)
where s1 and s2 are constant.
Substituting the above general function forms and VC
0 ðtÞ ¼ s1
into Eq. (45) provides:
rðs1tþs2Þ¼
"
diþdjþðlþhÞs1
#
tþln
"
a
Di6iþDjð16iÞas1
#
þln½ ca
Di

16j
þDj6jas1
#
þDiqiþDjqj2
þb
2s21
4ki
þb
2s21
4kj
(47)
Hereafter, the parameter values satisfy:
Using the similar approach, Eq. (48) is submitted into Eq. (44),
and the results in Proposition 3 can be attained. This accomplishes
the Proof.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 4
Similarly to the Proof of Proposition 2, Eq. (9) can be rewritten as
a random integral:
(
tðtÞ ¼ t0 þ
ðt
0
½Y ðlþ hÞtðsÞdsþ
ðt
0
s
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
tðsÞ
p
dPðsÞ
tð0Þ ¼ t0  0
(49)
where
Y ¼ aðrþ lþ hÞ
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ Djð16iÞðrþ lþ hÞ þ a

di þ dj

þ aðrþ lþ hÞ
Di

16j
ðrþ lþ hÞ þ Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi þ dj
þ aðrþ lþ hÞ
Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adj
 b
2di þ dj
2kiðrþ lþ hÞ
 b
2di þ dj
2kjðrþ lþ hÞ
:
Accordingly, the expectation of pollutant stock satisfies:
(
E½tðtÞ ¼ t0 þ
ðt
0
fY ðlþ hÞE½tðsÞgds
E½tð0Þ ¼ t0
(50)
Similarly, the solution of the above equation can be obtained as
follows:
8>>>><
>>>>:
s1 ¼ 
di þ dj
rþ lþ h
s2 ¼ ln
"
a
Di6i þ Djð16iÞ  as1
#,
rþ ln½ ca
Di

16j
þ Dj6j  as1
#,
r
þ

Diqi þ Djqj  2
.
rþ b2s21
.
4rki þ b2s21
.
4rkj
(48)
rVCðtÞ ¼ max
Eh;uh
8><
>:
lnðaqiÞ þ ln

caqj

þ Di
h
qi 6iqi 

16j

qj
i
þ Dj
h
qj 6jqj  ð16iÞqi
i
 kiu2i
kju2j 

di þ dj

tþ VC 0 ðtÞ


a

qi þ qj

 bui þ uj ðlþ hÞt

þ s
2ðtÞ
2
VC
00
ðtÞ
9>=
>; (43)
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8><
>:
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
¼ Y
lþ hþ

t0 
Y
lþ h

eðlþhÞt ; lim
t/∞
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
¼ Y
lþ h
E
h
tCð0Þ
i
¼ t0
(51)
Further, applying Ito^ lemma to Eq. (9) gives:
(
dt2ðtÞ ¼
h
2Yþ s2

t 2ðlþ hÞt2
i
dt þ 2ts ffiffiffitp dPðtÞ
t2ð0Þ ¼ ðt0Þ2  0
(52)
The above equation can be rewritten as a random integral form
below:
and its expectation is,
8><
>:
E


t2

t

¼t20þ
ðt
0
n
2Yþs2

E
h
t

s
i
2

lþh

E


t2

s

ds
E
h
t2

0
i
¼

t0
2
(54)
Substituting the result of Eq. (51) into Eq. (54) and rewritten it as
the differential form:
Solving the above linear non-homogeneous differential equa-
tion yields:
Then, the variance of the pollutant stock can be computed as:
S
h
tCðtÞ
i
¼ E
h
t2ðtÞ
i

h
E
h
tCðtÞ
ii2
¼ s
2Y 2½Y ðlþ hÞt0eðlþhÞt þ ½Y 2ðlþ hÞt0e2ðlþhÞt
2ðlþ hÞ2
(57)
Appendix E. Proof of Propositions 5 to 7
According to Eqs. (6 and 12), there exists:
8<
: t
2ðtÞ ¼ t20 þ
ðt
0
h
2Yþ s2

tðsÞ  2ðlþ hÞt2ðsÞ
i
dsþ
ðt
0
2tðsÞs
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
tðsÞ
p
dPðsÞ
t2ð0Þ ¼ ðt0Þ2  0
(53)
8><
>:
dE
h
t2ðtÞ
i.
dt ¼

2Yþ s2
h Y
lþ hþ

t0 
Y
lþ h

eðlþhÞt
i
 2ðlþ hÞE
h
t2ðtÞ
i
E
h
t2ðtÞ
i
¼ ðt0Þ2
(55)
8>><
>>:
E
h
t2ðtÞ
i
¼ t20e2ðlþhÞt þ
Y

2Yþ s2

2ðlþ hÞ2

1 e2ðlþhÞt

þ

2Yþ s2

½t0ðlþ hÞ  Y
ðlþ hÞ2

eðlþhÞt  e2ðlþhÞt

E
h
t2ð0Þ
i
¼ ðt0Þ2
(56)
8>><
>>:
qC*i  qD*i ¼ 
ðrþ lþ hÞDjð16iÞðrþ lþ hÞ þ adj
Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ Djð16iÞðrþ lþ hÞ þ a

di þ dj
½Di6iðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi
qC*j  qD*j ¼ 
ðrþ lþ hÞDi16jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi
Di

16j
ðrþ lþ hÞ þ Dj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adi þ djDj6jðrþ lþ hÞ þ adj
(58)
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Clearly, qC*i < q
D*
i and q
C*
j < q
D*
j hold. Proposition 5 is proved.
Moreover, let ε>0, according to Eqs. (10 and 16), there exists:
8>><
>>:
uC*i  uD*i ¼
bdi
4kiðrþ lþ hÞ
uC*j  uD*j ¼
bdi
2kjðrþ lþ hÞ
(59)
As evidenced, uC*i >u
D*
i and u
C*
j >u
D*
j hold. Proposition 6 is
proved.
Lastly, according to Propositions 2 and 4, there exists:
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
 E
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ Y U
lþ h

1 eðlþhÞt

;
lim
t/∞
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
 lim
t/∞
E
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ Y U
lþ h
(60)
Apparently, Y<U holds, then for any t2ð0; ∞Þ exists:
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
 E
h
tDðtÞ
i
<0; lim
t/∞
E
h
tCðtÞ
i
 lim
t/∞
E
h
tDðtÞ
i
<0
(61)
Similarly, it follows:
S
h
tCðtÞ
i
 S
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ s
2ðYUÞ1 2eðlþhÞt þ e2ðlþhÞt
2ðlþ hÞ2
lim
t/∞
S
h
tCðtÞ
i
 lim
t/∞
S
h
tDðtÞ
i
¼ s
2ðY UÞ
2ðlþ hÞ2
<0 (62)
Moreover, for t2ð0; ∞Þ, the first derivative of 12eðlþhÞtþ
e2ðlþhÞt is greater than 0. Its value equals to 0 when 1  2eðlþhÞt þ
e2ðlþhÞt ¼ 0, and then S½tCðtÞ< S½tDðtÞ can be obtained.
Proposition 7 is proved.
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